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Executive Summary  
This study assesses the reaction of stock markets, when  Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (SWFs) announce that they have taken a stake in a listed company. It 
adds useful empirical results to the debate on the effect of SWFs on financial 
markets, which remains so far largely reliant on guess work.  
We perform an event study using a sample of 50 SWF acquisitions of equity 
stakes in listed companies around the world, from May 2005 to April 2008. 
According to our results, the announcement of an acquisition by a SWF has a 
transitory positive impact on the share price of the target company, but there 
is  no  lasting  effect.  This  stands  in  contrast  to  the  results  obtained  in  the 
academic  literature  for  the  investments  of  private  equity  funds,  and  to  a 
lesser extent pension funds.  
The tests conducted on a sub-sample of announcements targeting banks only 
made during the subprime crisis (between July 2007 and April 2008) do not 
exhibit  more  lasting  effects.  This  may  suggest  that  markets  are  not 
convinced that SWFs alone are capable of restoring the position of the banks 
concerned. 
These  results  are  however  subject  to  some  caveats,  and  notably,  the 
relatively  small size of the sample as well as  a selection bias in favour  of 
transparent SWFs, due to the lack of information on other funds.  
 Keywords: Sovereign Wealth Funds, Event Study. 
JEL Codes: G14, G34.   2 
1. The growing attention to SWF investments 
 
The  recent  acquisitions  made  by  Sovereign  Wealth  Funds  (SWFs)  in 
international banks have been receiving growing attention in the public debate. 
A sovereign wealth fund can be broadly defined as a government-owned or a 
government-controlled investment fund with a long-term investment horizon 
and very few explicit liabilities. It  invests the surpluses  of foreign exchange 
reserves,  fiscal  resources  or  commodity  exports  in  international  financial 
markets,  often  in  instruments  with  higher  risk/return  profiles  (e.g.  equities) 
than  the  usual  foreign  exchange  reserve  management  funds.  The  higher 
involvement of these funds as investors and shareholders in financial markets 
raises  questions  as  to  their  ability  to  influence  market  functioning  and 
valuation.  
 
The governance, transparency and management objectives of SWFs remain an 
open  issue.  Some  funds  show  a  willingness  to  remain  passive  shareholders 
with a long-term strategy. However, taking into account their sheer size and 
its future increase, it is unlikely that they will have absolutely no influence on 
the share price and governance of target companies and on market dynamics 
in  general.  By  the  same  token,  they  could  also  have  a  bearing  on  asset 
valuation and risk premia. 
 
The purpose of this study is to measure the reaction of stock markets, when 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) announce that they have taken a stake in a 
listed company. To our knowledge, only four very recent papers deal with a 
similar issue.  
 
The first of these papers is an occasional paper by the ECB by Beck and Fidora 
(2008), which is focused on the announcements of disinvestments made by 
the Norwegian SWF. It concludes that these announcements have no effect on 
stock  prices,  as  they  are  only  made  after  the  disinvestments  have  been 
completed.  However,  this  result  may  just  reflect  the  specific  policy  of  the 
Norwegian SWF which, unlike most other SWFs, explicitly aims at minimising 
its market impact.  
 
The event study of Fotak et alii (2008) is closer to the scope of our paper, as it 
excludes the investments by the Norwegian SWF. It also shares with our paper 
a selection bias in favour of Asian SWFs, which is difficult to avoid considering   3 
the  lack  of  detailed  information  on  many  middle-eastern  SWFs.1  However, 
there are two differences with our approach. First, Fotak  et alii (2008) do not 
seem to control for heteroskedasticity which is a major characteristic of daily 
stock  price  changes,  whereas  we  fit  conditional  volatility  by  GARCH(1,1) 
processes and use these fitted series to standardize abnormal price changes. 
Second,  Fotak  et  alii  (2008)  try  to  assess  the  long-term  effect  of  SWF 
acquisitions  whereas  this  study  focuses  solely  on  the  short-term  effects 
(horizon of 10 business days). They find more lasting but non-linear effects: 
positive in the short run and negative in the long-term. 
 
The two other papers are by Chhaochharia and Laeven (2008) and by Kotter 
and Lel (2008). These papers are very similar in essence, as they both use an 
event study in a first step and, then, in a second step, attempt to explain the 
abnormal price reaction by the transparency score of the SWF. To the best of 
our knowledge these two papers do not control for heteroskedasticity in their 
event study. However their main conclusions are consistent with ours as they 
find positive short-term effects of SWFs acquisitions.  
 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  section  2  details  the  method  and  the 
sample used, section 3 summarises the main results, and section 4 concludes 
and suggests ways to expand and improve our study. 
 
2. What are the possible outcomes of SWFs acquisitions 
on stock markets ? 
 
Following  the  announcement  of  a  SWF  investment  in  a  listed  company,  the 
share  price  of  a  target  company  can  move  according  to  three  different 
dynamics.  
 
The first possible outcome is that the share price of the target company tracks 
closely  the  movements  of  the  global  market  index  in  the  days  immediately 
following  the  announcement.  In  this  instance,  the  transactions  of  the  SWFs 
have no influence on the market. This outcome is most likely to occur if the 
                                                       
1 36 of the 75 events (48%) covered by their study are from Singaporean SWFs , compared with 26 out of 50 events 
(52%)  for our study.  19 of the 75 events they cover are from two Malaysian and relatively marginal SWFs, which 
brings the total of Singaporean plus Malaysian stake announcements to 55/75 = 73% of the total number of events 
surveyed by Fotak et alii (2008).    4 
SWF takes a small stake or if the news is already integrated in market prices 
due to early leaks.  
 
A second possibility is that the announcement has a short-lived influence. The 
expected outcome in this case is that the share price of the target company 
outperforms the market index (“abnormal” positive price change) on the days 
immediately following the announcement. This can be due to a mere liquidity 
effect: the price increases in response to the expected rise in the demand of 
shares. This outcome is most likely to occur when the SWF takes large stakes. 
Another  interpretation  is  that  the  SWF  investment  relaxes  the  short-term 
financial constraints of the company, even though it does not improve its long-
term  profitability.  Such  an  immediate  reaction  of  the  market  reflects  semi-
strong  efficiency:  the  new  information  is  immediately  reflected  in  the  stock 
price.  
 
The final possibility is that the announcement has a lasting influence on the 
behaviour of the share price of the target company. In this case, the market 
expects  the  SWF  to  have  a  significant  leverage  over  the  governance  of  the 
company and hence its profitability. The direction of this long-term effect can 
go  either  way  depending  on  the  circumstances:  positive  if,  as  a  long-term 
shareholder, the SWF improves the long-term return of the company (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986); or negative, if as a state-owned entity, the SWF pursues 
strategic  goals  inconsistent  with  the  maximization  of  the  company‟s 
profitability.  
 
2.1  The method used 
 
The simplest way of testing the different hypotheses is to have recourse to the 
method  of  event  studies.  Efficient  markets  process  information  immediately 
(Fama, 1965; Campbell et al. 1997): the arrival of new information - such as a 
stake taken by a SWF in a company - should immediately be reflected in the 
share  price.  It  is  therefore  possible  to  detect  an  “abnormal”  reaction  in 
response to an announcement by looking at the behaviour of the share price of 
the target company around the date of the announcement. In what follows we 
define  the  “abnormal”  price  change  as  the  difference  between  the  actual 
change  of  the  share  price  of  the  target  company  and  its  normal  change, 
measured with the help of a market model, which controls for the sensitivity of 
the share price to the market developments (for more details see Appendix). 
   5 
Abnormal price changes are computed for each target company, on the day of 
the “event” and the days of the “event window”. The “event” is defined as the 
public announcement of the participation of a SWF in a listed company. The 
“event window” is the period surrounding the announcement over which tests 
are  conducted,  with  the  day  of  announcement  being  defined  as  day  0.  To 
capture  the  reaction  of  the  financial  markets  in  case  of  a  leak  before  the 
announcement, or an announcement after the acquisition of the shares, event 
studies often make the event window begin two days before the official day of 
the announcement. In the tests for abnormal price variations we use the event 
window: [-2, +10]. 
 
The  parameters  of  the  market  model  are  estimated  during  a  period  of 
estimation,  prior  and  unconnected  to  the  event  window  (to  avoid  all 
disturbances  in  the  estimation  of  the  parameters).  The  period  of  estimation 
used in this study covers a period of 163 days, finishing 11 days before the 
event. 
 
 We  use  parametric  and  non  parametric  tests,  following  the  standard  event 
methodology (see Appendix for details) to test whether the average abnormal 
price  change  is  significantly  different  from  zero.  In  a  first  step  we  compute 
daily average abnormal price changes (averaged over all events for each day 
of  the  event  window,  including  the  event  day)  and  cumulative  average 
abnormal prince changes (average abnormal price changes cumulated through 
time), then we test whether they are significantly different from zero. As stock 
price changes are heteroskedastic and volatility can vary throughout the event 
window, we choose to standardize the abnormal price variation using a GARCH 
process, in order to control for heteroskedasticity before applying parametric 
tests and the Corrado rank test. 
 
2.2   The sample 
 
Our database of events covers 50 acquisitions made from May 2005 to April 
2008 by SWFs from 5 countries: China, Hong-Kong, Qatar, Singapore and the 
United Arab Emirates. The target companies are listed in 23 different countries 
ranging from Canada to Vietnam. The database of events has been constructed 
using  sources  such  as  Bloomberg,  financial  publications  and  information 
coming from the SWFs themselves. The bulk of the information is therefore 
biased towards recent events, and investments by the most transparent funds. 
Market data (share have been extracted from Bloomberg, such as the stock   6 
price of the company concerned and the stock index of the market considered, 
focusing on a period of 500 days around the date of the event. 
 
3. Main results 
The test results are shown using two different samples: the complete sample 
comprising  the  50  stakes‟  announcements  and  a  reduced  sample  limited  to 
recent acquisitions made during the sub prime crisis.  
 
3.1  An  outperformance  of  the  share  price  immediately  after  the 
announcement… 
 
The test results for all 50 events are displayed in Table 1. They show that on 
average,  there  is  a  positive  reaction  in  the  markets  on  the  day  of  the 
announcement  of  the  acquisition  of  a  stake  by  a  SWF.  Around  the 
announcement  (nearly  always  the  day  of  the  announcement  or  a  few  days 
before  or  after),  there  is  an  abnormal  positive  reaction  of  the  stock  price 
(columns 2 and 3 of Table 1). For both the standard parametric test and the 
Corrado non-parametric test (last line of Table 1), the abnormal daily variation 
of the stock price (AR) is strictly positive on the day of the event at the 1% 
percent significance level. On average, the abnormal rate of change is around 
6%. But as two events on emerging markets clearly appear as outliers with 
positive abnormal price changes over 15% on the event day, we repeated the 
tests excluding these two events. The results of these tests on the database 
reduced to 48 events are displayed in the last four columns of table 1. The 
main results stay the same though the average abnormal price change on the 
event day drops to “only” 3,85%. This illustrates the sensitivity of the estimate 
of  the  average  abnormal  price  change  to  the  extreme  abnormal  price 
variations that can be observed on emerging markets, despite the correction 
for volatility that we apply. The outliers excluded are two announcements of 
acquisitions  on  emerging  markets  that  where  accompanied  by  a  spectacular 
outperformance of the stock‟s price.2  
 
   
                                                       
2 One of the company is China Eastern Airlines, for which quotation was suspended a few days before the 
announcement.   7 
 
Table 1 Abnormal price changes standardized with GARCH 
50 events database  48 events database 
Day  AR   Signif. 
level 
Cum AR.  Signif. 
level 






-2  0.939   34.8%  0.939   34.8%  0.985  32.46%  0.985  32.5% 
-1  -0.880   37.9%  0.042   96.7%  -0.826  40.88%  0.112  91.0% 
0   6.075***  0.001%  3.542***  0.04%  3.847***  0.012%  2.313**  2.07% 
+1  0.212   83.2%  3.173***  0.15%  0.264  79.17%  2.135**  3.28% 
+2  1.251  21.1%  3.398***  0.06%  1.097  27.28%  2.400**  1.64% 
+3  -1.764*   7.8%  2.381**  1.7%  -1.879*  6.02%  1.424  15.4% 
+4  0.670  50.3%  2.458**  1.4%  0.654  51.29%  1.566  11.7% 
+5  -1.234   21.7%  1.863*   6.2%  -1.245  21.32%  1.024  30.6% 
+6  -1.166   24.4%  1.368   17.1%  -1.131  25.82%  0.589  55.6% 
+7  -1.313   18.9%  0.883   37.7%  -1.236  21.65%  0.168  86.7% 
+8  0.601   54.8%  1.023   30.6%  0.722  47.04%  0.378  70.6% 
+9  -1.034   30.1%  0.681   49.6%  -1.227  21.98%  0.007  99.4% 
+10  -0.084   93.3%  0.631   52.8%  -0.053  95.77%  -0.008  99.4% 
Corrado rank test [0]: 3.235*** (0.12%) 
Corrado rank test [-2,+10]:-0.438 (66%) 
Corrado rank test [0]: 2.8*** (0.5%) 
Corrado rank test [-2,+10]: -0,6 (55%) 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
On the whole we agree with the first part of the conclusion made by Fotak et 
alii  (2008)  and  with  the  results  of  Chhaochharia  and  Laeven  (2008)  and  of 
Kotter  and  Lel  (2008):  there  is  a  positive  immediate  effect  of  the 
announcements of SWFs acquisitions on the share prices of the companies.  
     8 
Chart 1A: Average daily abnormal price 
changes over the period [-11 days ; +20 
days] for the entire sample (50 events) 
Chart 1B: Cumulated abnormal price 
changes over the period [-11 days ; 
+20 days] for the entire sample (50 
events) 
 
The red vertical line indicates the day of the 
acquisition, i.e. day 0 
 
The red vertical line indicates the day of 
the acquisition, i.e. day 0 
3.2 ...which dissipates rapidly 
Nevertheless,  as  illustrated  by  Chart  1A,  the  effect  dissipates  rapidly.  It  is 
impossible to discern a significant effect on the average abnormal price change 
on the day following the announcement. This is shown by the relatively quick 
return back to zero of the cumulated abnormal price variation (Chart 1B): from 
the  fifth  day  following  the  announcement,  the  effect  on  the  cumulated 
abnormal price change is no longer significant (columns 4 and 5 of Table 1). 
This seems to indicate that there is neither a long lasting positive nor negative 
effect following the entry into the capital of a company by a sovereign wealth 
fund.  
 
This conclusion must be treated with caution. The average results for the fifty 
announcements collected could conceal heterogeneity in the effect of the stake 
hold by  the SWF.  This could be due  to the  differing perception of investors 
towards  the  different  funds  as  well  as  the  differing  strategy  of  the  funds, 
depending on the markets they are investing in. Part of this positive transitory 
effect  could  be  explained  by  SWFs  investments  in  distressed  companies 
(Chhaochharia  and  Laeven,  2008),  large  stakes  (Chhaochharia  and  Laeven, 
2008) and the SWF‟s transparency (Kotter and Lel, 2008). 
 
Contrary to Fotak et alii (2008) and to Chhaochharia and Laeven (2008) we 
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therefore are unable to confirm their findings of a negative long term effect.3 
We are limited to stating that according to our results the cumulative abnormal 
price  increase  seems  to  disappear  a  few  days  after  the  impact  of  the 
instantaneous market reaction, which does not exclude the possibility  that in 
the long-term the markets‟ reaction could turn negative. However the standard 
methodology of the events study does not lend itself well to long-term tests 
(Kothari and Warner, 2007). The primary reason for this is that by extending 
the  window  of  events  the  risk  is  increased  that  events  other  than  the 
acquisition of shares by a SWF will have an effect on the share price, thereby 
distorting the results. There is also a range of more technical reasons, notably 
the fact that an extension of the window of events to test the long-term effects 
is  usually  accompanied  by  an  increased  cross  correlation  between  the 
securities abnormal price changes, as well as the fact that specification errors 
of  the  normal  price  changes  are  magnified  over  a  long-term  horizon.  As  it 
appears  that  SWFs  often  invest  in  distressed  companies  (Chhaochharia  and 
Laeven,  2008)  it  is  of  particular  importance  to  compare  the  long-term 
performance  of  their  investments  with  the  long-term  performance  of  similar 
companies, before drawing any definitive conclusions. 
 
The weak persistence of the effect of the entrance by a SWF into the capital of 
a  company  could  seem  paradoxical  as  our  sample  contains  events 
corresponding  to  the  recapitalisation  of  companies  by  SWFs  following  the 
losses or depreciations occurring during the sub prime crisis. 
 
In order to test whether the acquisitions made by SWFs during the period of 
the crisis have a longer lasting effect, we have set up a sub-sample of events 
observed during the sub prime crisis. 
 
3.3 During the sub prime crisis : an apparent scepticism of markets towards 
SWFs as ‘lenders of last resort’ 
 
We have tested the effect of the acquisitions of SWFs on a sub-range of 14 
events,  occurring  between  July  2007  and  April  2008.  These  events  include 
investments  by  SWFs  in  Citigroup,  UBS,  Morgan  Stanley,  Merrill  Lynch  and 
Crédit Suisse. 
 
                                                       
3 Chhaochharia and Laeven (2008) find a negative long term impact at a 10% significance level only for one sub-
sample of investments.   10 
To capture the effect of the crisis on the companies we start the estimation 
period closer to the day of the event whilst still ending it 11 days before the 
event, thereby reducing the estimation window to 119 days. This reduction of 
the  estimation  period  allows  us  to  take  a  better  account  of  the  increased 
sensitivity of stock prices to market developments during the crisis.4 
 
The results obtained are displayed in Table 2 and show  some differences with 
those  seen  in  the  study  using  the  complete  sample.  The  positive  effect  is 
somewhat weaker in the short-term. The daily abnormal price change on the 
day of the announcement of the investment by a SWF is significant at the 
threshold of  10%,  yet is only around 2% (instead of 6% for the complete 
sample). This very short lived positive effect  – confirmed by Corrado‟s Rank 
Test - is too weak to remain statistically significant when it is aggregated in 
cumulated  abnormal  price  changes  (columns  4  and  5  of  Table  2).  Even  if 
cumulated  abnormal  price  changes  remain  positive  over  30  days  after  the 
event (Chart 2), they are not statistically significant. 
 
Table  2  Abnormal  price  changes  standardized  with  GARCH  –  14  events 
during the Subprime crisis 
Day  AR  S.l.  cum. AR  S.l. 
-2  0.54607   58.5%  0.54607   58.5% 
-1  -0.87274   38.3%  0.23099   81.7% 
0   1.81571 *  6.9%  0.85970   39.0% 
+1  0.54087   58.9%  1.01495   31.0% 
+2  0.55168   58.1%  1.15452   24.8% 
+3  -0.68503   49.3%  0.77427   43.9% 
+4  0.86488   38.7%  1.04372   29.7% 
+5  -0.45645   64.8%  0.81494   41.5% 
+6  0.53516   59.3%  0.94671   34.4% 
+7  -0.80640   42.0%  0.64312   52.0% 
+8  0.26577   79.0%  0.69333   48.8% 
+9  -1.40032   16.1%  0.25957   79.5% 
+10  1.10993   26.7%  0.55723   57.7% 
Corrado rank test [0]: 2.21120** (signif. level 2.7%) 
Corrado rank test [-2,+10]: 1.25795 (signif. level 21%) 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
                                                       
4 According to some preliminary tests not reported here, the alphas in the market model do not change much, but the 
betas increase during the crisis.   11 
 
Chart  2:  Cumulative  standardized  abnormal  price  changes  for  14 
events during the Subprime crisis 
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These results are subject to some caveats: there are few events in this sub-
sample  and  the  crisis  constitutes  a  factor  common  to  all  events  which 
invalidates the hypothesis of independent abnormal price changes. Moreover, 
the  investors  are  probably  uncertain  of  the  long-term  impact  of  these 
investments  in  this  particular  context.  One  possible  interpretation  of  our 
results is that investors are not convinced of the capacity of the investment by 
SWFs  to  restore,  on  a  permanent  basis,  the  position  of  the  companies 
concerned. 
 
3.4 Comparison with the event studies on the investments of Private Equity 
and Pension Funds 
 
This absence of a lasting positive effect for the two samples studied is wholly 
consistent with the findings of the others event studies on SWFs acquisitions. 
But  it  contrasts  with  some  of  the  results  of  the  empirical  literature  on  the 
investments of pension funds, and above all with the main conclusions of the 
event  studies  on  the  investments  of  private  equity  funds.  This  difference  in 
results could be easily explained if SWFs were totally passive investors. This is 
obviously  not  the  case  for  a  large  number  of  SWFs:  SWFs  from  emerging 
countries often hold some controlling shares (Miracky et alii, 2008) and some 
SWFs  holding  minority  stakes  -  such  as  the  Norwegian  GPF  -  global  or  the 
French FRR - actively use their voting rights to promote a better governance of 
the companies in which they invest5. 
 
The literature on private equity operations and leveraged buy outs generally 
concludes that there is a notable and lasting positive effect on the value and 
the  performance  of  the  target  companies  (Cumming  et  alii,  2007).  The 
difference with our results – and more generally with the results of the event 
studies on SWFs- can be explained by the under-valuation of the companies 
targeted  by  private  equity  funds,  by  the  fiscal  advantages  gained  from  the 
interest relating to their debt programme and by the positive effect they are 
assumed to have on the governance of the company. The private equity funds 
are known for their policy of aggressive restructuring of the companies they 
                                                       
5 Recall that the GPF and the FRR are excluded from this event study. The FRR is a relatively small fund 
and its investment horizon is not as long term as the horizon of “permanent” sovereign funds such as the 
GPF. The GPF stands apart amongst the main sovereign funds: it has a very specific strategy of minimizing 
the impact of its investments and disinvestments on stock markets.   13 
have  acquired,  allowing  them  to  quickly  increase  the  profitability  of  the 
company. 
 
Some of the literature on pension funds shareholdings finds a positive effect of 
the  investments  of  the  Californian  Pension  Fund  CalPERS  on  stock  prices. 
These  results  have  been  labelled  as  the  “CalPERS”  effect.  Alongside 
shareholder  resolutions  to  change  the  management  of  the  underperforming 
companies, CalPERS uses its communication policy as a  tool to identify and 
disclose underperforming managers: CalPERS has published an annual ‘Focus 
List  of  Underperformers’  since  1992.  Nevertheless,  the  positive  effect  of 
CalPERS activism on the share prices of the companies in which it holds stakes 
remains controversial. Thus, English et alii (2004) confirm the CalPERS effect, 
whilst Nelson (2006) finds that after a methodological bias has been corrected, 
the effect becomes non-significant. Despite the size of CalPERS, its long history 
as an active shareholder and the publicity around its announcements there is 
no consensus on a positive and lasting “CalPERS” effect. Therefore, it is not 
very surprising to have not found a lasting positive effect of the investments 
made by SWFs.  
 
As sovereign foreign investors, SWFs have to be more cautious than private 
long run investors. Also, SWFs do not have homogeneous practices as to the 
transparency  of  their  investment  policies  and  market  participants  may  have 
some  difficulties  in  interpreting  their  involvement  in  the  governance  of  the 
companies.  What  is  more,  even  the  most  transparent  SWFs  often  pursue 
macroeconomic goals, besides purely financial goals such as the maximisation 
of returns relative to risks. Some SWFs aim at stabilizing the incomes drawn 
from commodity exports, some are development funds, some aim at stabilizing 
their exchange rates, etc. None of these motives are of course illegitimate, but 
objectively it is more complex for market participants to assess the motives of 
SWFs investments than those of private equity funds or pension funds.  
 
For a better assessment of the long run impact of SWFs on the governance of 
the companies in which they invest, more robust results from long run event 
studies  are  needed.  As  has  been  indicated,  the  scope  of  our  event-study  is 
limited  to  the  assessment  of  short  run  effects.  Pursuing  the  study  into  the 
long-term  is  however  difficult  in  regards  to  the  robustness  of  the  obtained 
results: whilst  the  methodology  used  in  the short-term events study is well 
prepared, the long-term methodology still needs to be improved (Kothari and 
Warner, 2007). Using a standard long-term methodology, Fotak et alii (2008) 
find that the acquisitions of SWFs have a negative long-term impact on the   14 
profitability of the acquired company. However the elimination of 11 events out 
of 53 is sufficient to remove this negative effect. Considering the illiquidity and 
the volatility of  many of the shares on emerging markets and the fact  that 
SWFS often invest in distressed companies (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2008), 
it  cannot  yet  be  excluded  that  this  negative  impact  has  other  causes  than 
solely the governance policy of these SWFs.  
 
4. SWFs: Guardian angels or strategic investors? 
The ongoing debate on the role played by SWFs on financial  markets is far 
from being settled. But with elevated oil prices, the accumulation of excess FX 
reserves and the difficulties of the banking sector, the investments of SWFs 
have attracted growing attention.  
 
As confirmed by four other recent studies on the subject, as well as by this 
study, the use of event studies can help us to understand how the markets 
react to the announcement of a SWF taking a stake in a listed company. These 
first studies yield interesting results but are subject to some caveats. Due to 
the lack of comprehensive data on SWF investments we inevitably focus on the 
most  publicized  investments.  Therefore,  these  primary  results  have  to  be 
considered with caution. 
 
Overall, for the fifty events of our database we confirm the result of Fotak et 
alii  (2008),  Kotter  and  Lel  (2008)  and  Chhaochharia  and  Laeven  (2008), 
according to whom there is an immediate, strong and positive effect of SWF 
investments on share prices. Part of this positive short-term effect could be 
explained  by  SWF  investments  in  distressed  companies  (Chhaochharia  and 
Laeven, 2008), large stakes (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2008) and the SWF‟s 
transparency (Kotter and Lel, 2008).  
 
Contrary to Fotak et alii (2008) we do not confirm that SWFs have a negative 
long-run effect on the target companies. However, we do not attempt to gauge 
the effect of the announcement of SWFs acquiring stakes beyond 10 days after 
the event.  
 
The  tests  we  conduct  on  a  sub-sample  of  announcements  made  during  the 
Subprime crisis yield results similar to those obtained with the whole sample. 
The announcements of the SWFs investments have a short-term positive effect 
on  the  share  price.  But  we  do  not  find  more  lasting  effects.  One  possible   15 
interpretation is that markets are not convinced that SWFs alone are capable 
of restoring the position of the banks concerned. 
 
Much work remains to be done on SWFs. In the field of event studies, major 
improvements would be to construct databases which are more representative 
of the relative sizes of the SWFs and to study in detail the investment policies 
of the main funds. SWFs still have heterogeneous investment policies, though 
the recent agreement on a set of voluntary best practices (IMF, 2008) could 
lead to some homogenization of their practices as investors.  
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Appendix: Testing for abnormal price changes 
 
The abnormal price change for security i and time observation t is computed as 
the  difference  between  the  actual  logged  price  change  and  a  theoretical 
“normal” logged price change that would prevail in the absence of the event6: 
N
it it it R R AR  
Where it AR , it R , N
it R   are,  respectively,  the  abnormal,  actual  and  normal  logged 
price changes. 
 
The “normal” price change is computed, as is usual, from the market model7: 
  mt i i
N
it R R ˆ ˆ   
Where  mt R  is the market price index change,  i ˆ  and  i ˆ  are estimated over an 
estimation  period  ending  10  days  before  the  day  of  announcement  of  the 
investment. 
 
Cumulative  abnormal  price  changes  (CARi[ 1, 2])  can  then  be  computed  by 
totalling the abnormal price changes recorded during the event window [ 1, 2], 





it i AR CAR  
Usually  ARs  are  computed  for  each  day  of  the  event  window  and  CARs  are 
computed over windows progressively extended from the first day of the event 
and the days following it.  
 
Standardized cumulative abnormal price changes can then be computed as: 
                                                       
6 Taking the difference of the logged price rather than the exact rate of growth of the price has the advantage of 
reducing the kurtosis of the series.  
7 The market model is generally fitted on the stock return - including the dividend - rather than on the rate of growth of 
the stock price. However at a daily frequency the two series are close and yield very similar results. Besides, the 
short-term expected effect of the announcement of the stake taken by a SWF is only on the stock price. Contrary to 
the CAPM model the market model does not rely on interest rates for which homogeneous data are difficult to collect 
for both emerging and developed countries. However, over short event windows the results of event studies are not 










SCAR   
where  2 1, i  is the standard error of  2 1, i CAR . 
The  standard  error  can  be  estimated  using  different  hypotheses  on  the 
variance of the abnormal price change. In this study, we estimate the standard 
error  alternatively  assuming  the  homoskedasticity  of  the  abnormal  price 
change and assuming heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity is modelled here 
using  the  GARCH(1,1)  process  (Bollerslev,  1986).  To  save  space,  only  the 
results for GARCH standardized abnormal price change are reported. But the 
results  of  the  tests  are  similar  under  both  methods  of  standardization: 
controlling  for  heteroskedasticity  reduces,  on  average,  the  size  of  abnormal 
price change over the event window, but does not change the main results.  
 
The  following  step  is  to  compute  the  average  of  SCARs  for  all  N  securities 
included in the event study: 
 










Where L1 is the length of the period over which the market model has been 
estimated. 
J2 has a standard normal distribution in large samples. When J2 is above the 
threshold  associated  with  a  5%  significance  level,  the  hypothesis  of  zero 
cumulative  abnormal  price  changes  is  rejected.  J2  can  of  course  also  be 
computed over periods of only one day: therefore in tables reporting the test 
results we display J2 for each day of our event period, which begins 2 days 
before the day of the event and ends 10 days after. We also report J2 for sub-
periods progressively extended towards the end of the event window; that is 
for the following sub periods: [-2,-2], [-2,-1], …, [-2,+10].  
 
In  this  paper  the  graphs  of  cumulative  abnormal  price  changes  display 
standardized  cumulative  abnormal  price  changes  computed  over  a  larger 
window (usually [-11,+30]) to give a more general picture of the evolution of 
the  SCARs.  But  the  tests  themselves  are  not  reported  for  sub-periods 
extending  over  10  days  after  the  event  because  our  results  show  that  the 
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from zero after the day of the event. Extending the tests beyond 10 days after 
the  event  entails  the  risk  of  capturing  the  effects  of  events  other  than  the 
announcement of a stake taken by a SWF. 
 
Non-parametric  tests  are  generally  used  to  check  the  results  of  parametric 
tests  such  as  the  tests  based  on  the  statistic  J2.  In  this  paper  we  use  the 
Corrado rank test, which is based on the rankings of abnormal price changes 
(see Campbell et alii, 1997 or Serra, 2004 for a detailed description). The main 
advantage  of  non-parametric  tests  is  that  they  do  not  rely  on  a  specific 
assumption about the distribution of price changes. 
 